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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are arbitration law professors who teach
and write about arbitration, including the Federal
Arbitration Act's ("FAA") preemptive power over
state law.l

Amici have an interest in the thoughtful vetting
and resolution of important but overlooked FAA preemption issues-issues that continue, in om· view, to
confound the law of FAA§ 2 preemption. Our primary objective in filing this brief is to place the case
at bar in the context of these issues, in order to assist the Court in reaching the best possible decision
for the development of FAA preemption law.
The views expressed in this brief are our own and
do not reflect the beliefs of the institutions with
which we are affiliated.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This brief is limited to addressing a central argument advanced by Petitioner and its Amici:
namely, that the FAA preempts the Discover Bank
rule because the rule applies only to dispute resolution clauses and not "all contracts," (Pet. Br. 17, 31),
and thus fails to "placeD arbitration agreements on
equal footing with all other contracts." (ld. at 28.)

1 The parties have filed letters consenting to the filing of any
Amicus Curiae brief with the Clerk of the Court. Pursuant to
Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or
in part, and no person other than Amici or its counsel made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief
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We contend that the argument is fundamentally
flawed for two independent reasons.

First, the FAA's purpose to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as any other contract is a
means to an end, not an end in itself. That end has
always been understood as enabling the arbitration
process to compete on a level playing field with litigation, free of the artificial legal impediments that
had once stood in its way. The problem that the
FAA sought to address was not the problem of states
having different rules for the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements than they did, say,
for exculpatory clauses or marriage contracts. Although contracts all share common elements, the
law necessarily treats them differently (and for good
reason): Some are entitled to the special remedy of
specific performance; some are unenforceable because their subject matter is contrary to public policy; others must be in w1-iting in order to be enforced.
The true purpose of the FAA was therefore not to
make all contracts enforceable in the same way, for
enforceability plainly differs from contract to contract. Instead, it was to overcome the early "judicial
hostility to arbitration," Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480
(1989) (emphasis added), so that the arbitral process
could emerge as a genuine "alternative to litigation."
(Pet. Br. at 26.) We agree with Petitioner that this
is, in effect, a type of antidiscrimination principle.
(ld. at 28, 29.) But it is a principle primarily directed at arbitration qua process, not qua contract.

Second, even if the FAA's antidiscrimination
principle seeks to eliminate the law's differential

3
treatment of m·bitration agreements vis-a-vis other
agreements-rather than, as we argue, its treatment
of arbitration vis-a-vis litigation-a state law need
not be preempted just because it fails to apply universally to "all" contracts. (Pet_ Br. at 3, 17, 31, 40.)
Such a requirement is not just logically incoherent,
it is detrimental to any national policy that seeks the
legitimate, balanced development of arbitration.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRUE MEANING OF THE
FAA'S NONDISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLE IS TO ENSURE
"EQUAL FOOTING" BE1WEEN
ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION

Petitioner is correct to note that FAA § 2 expresses a "fundamental nondiscrimination principle." (Pet. Br. at 28; see id. at 27, 29, 36, 37, :42.)
Numerous courts and commentators have likewise
grasped the nondiscrimination underpinnings of
FAA § 2 preemption.2 So, too, have several Amici
who support Petitioner. But Petitioner is incorrect
to contend that the end of that principle is to treat
arbitration agreements equally with other contracts.
2 See, e.g., Bane One Accepta.nce Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426
(5th Cir. 2004); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100, 1112-13 (Cal. 2005); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial
Hostility to A.rbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. Disp. Resol.
469, 483 (2006); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review
of State-Court Determinations of State LauJ in Constitutional
Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1955 & n.171 (2003); Joshua
Ratner & Christian Turner, Origin, Scope, and Irrevocability of
the Manifest Disregard of the Law Doctrine: Second Circuit
Views, 24 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 795, 797-98 {2006).

4
True, abrogating the ancient ouster and revocability doctrines that had disadvantaged pre-dispute
arbitration agreements more so than other contracts
was an important part of the FAA's antidiscrimination purpose. This is why the Court was correct to
observe that "placing arbitration agreements 'upon
the same footing as other contracts"' is a critical
purpose of the FAA. See Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984). But it is not the only or
even the overriding purpose, as the Court well
knows. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431
(1953) (describing the FAA's purpose as furthering
"the need for avoiding the delay and expense of
litigation'' but no where citing importance of treating
arbitration agreements the same as other
agreements), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas, 490
U.S. at 484 (1989).
None of the Court's decisions hinges on the purported equality between arbitration agreements and
all other agreements-something that is anyhow impossible given the sheer heterogeneity of contracts.
Instead, the Court's opinions stand for the proposition that states may not tl·eat arbitration agreements worse than other agreements simply because
of unwarranted "prejudice," (Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae [hereinafter
Chamber Amicus Br.] at 20), against the arbitral
process.3 The substance of the FAA's nondiscrimina3 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Hall St. Assocs. v.
Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 2007 WL 3283181 at *44, (No. 06989) {Stevens, J.) ("[T]he whole premise of the [FAA] ... [was
that] there was bias against arbitration."); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1381,
1384 (1996).
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tion mandate-notwithstanding the way in which it
has come to be expressed over time-is to ensure
that arbitration is placed on an "equal footing" with
litigation.
Prior to the case at bar, no case before the Court
has necessitated clarifying this distinction. This
case presents the ideal vehicle for doing so, and not
one day too soon. Lower courts are increasingly being asked to predict how the Court would decide
whether FAA § 2 preempts state statutes and judicial decisions that, like the Discover Bank standard,
(i) treat arbitration and litigation equally but (ii) do
not literally treat arbitration agreements the same
as all other agreements. Because such laws do not
offend the F..t\A's core nondiscrimination principle,
we argue that they are not preempted.
A.

The FAA's Foundational Purpose Was To Prevent Unjustified Discrimination Against
Arbitration So That It Could
Emerge As A Bona Fide Alternative To Litigation

The FAA was first and foremost a response to the
ancient common law "hostility" toward arbitration
qua process, not qua contract. See Rodrigue::: de Quijas v. Shearson!Am. E~tpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480
(1989) (emphasis added).
The pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate was the object of that
hostility only insofar as it made possible the
resolution of disputes out of court.
1. Historically, English judges had crafted artificial rules such as the revocability doctrine because
they sought to "retain, if not extend, their

6
jurisdiction" over that of their private sector
competitors-not because they had an interest in
privileging other agreements over arbit1•ation
agreements. 4 Early twentieth century commercial
reformers likewise did not lobby for the FAA because
they believed the1·e was something intrinsically
unfair about enforcing pre-dispute arbitration
agreements with less vigor than, say, plumbing
contracts. Rather, they did so because they sought a
viable alternative to the perceived "evil[s)" of litigation. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the Subcomms. of the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 34-35

4 See U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Sterling, To Make Valid and
Enforceable Certain .4greements for A.rbitration, S. Rep. No. 68536. at 2-3 (1924); Transcript of Oral Argument at *47, Hail
Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (Ginsburg, J.) (describing the pre-FAA
"distrust of arbitrators" in terms of a fear by judges that "arbitrators are stepping on our turf").
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(1924) [hereinafter 1924 hearings] (brief of Julius
Henry Cohen). 5

2. The text of the FAA is also inconsistent with
the goal of placing arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts. First, the statute
guarantees specific performance for breaches of
arbitration agreements, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2009), a special
remedy denied to the vast majority of contracts.6
Second, it provides an expedited procedure whereby
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards may be
enforced in court on a motion, without the need to
initiate a separate cause of action for breach of the

5 See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 816 {6th Cir. 1959) (noting that
the reason for making arbitration agreements "as effective enforceable [sic] as any other contract" was to enable "contracting
parties thereby to avoid ... the 'delay and expense of litigation"'); Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 8-9, 14 (1923) (describing one of the benefits of the FAA
as "reduc[ing] litigation" but no where mentioning the goal of
treating arbitration agreements the same as other agreements); Graham, To Validate Certain Agreements for Arbitration, H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (urging passage of the
FAA because "there is so much agitation at the costliness and
delays of litigation''); 8. Rep. No. 68-536 at 3 (describing FAA
§ 2's purpose in terms of enforcing arbitration agreements like
any contract, but acknowledging the fundamental business interest driving this purpose as a "desire to avoid the delay and
expense of litigation''); 66 Cong. Rec. 984 (1924) (describing the
underlying reason for making arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts in terms of advancing "business
interests [in avoiding] ... so much delay attending the trial of
lawsuits in courts").
6 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 359 (1981).

8
arbitration agreement.? Third, because the FAA has
been interpreted as preempting any state legislation
that "singl[es] out arbitration provisions for suspect
status," Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 (1996), it effectively immunizes arbitration
agreements from the contract defense of illegality-a
defense that may be invoked to deny enforcement of
most (if not all) other agreements.
Finally, a
fundamental tenet of domestic and international
arbitration
law-the
so-called
"separability
doctrine"-applies only to arbitration agreements
and no other agreement. s This doctrine indulges the
fiction that arbitration clauses are "separable" from
the container contract, such that even where the latter has been shown to be the product of duress or
fraud in the inducement, the f'ormer remains enforceable in principle. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.
Ct. 978, 984 (2008). Far from securing "equal
footing'' among contracts, these features of the FAA
unabashedly favor arbitration agreements. 9
The special solicitude that the FAA expresses
toward the agreement to arbitrate is, however,
consistent with "rais[ing] arbitration to the status
7 See 9 U.S. C. § 4 (2009) (setting forth streamlined procedure
for specific enforcement of arbitration agreements); id. at § 9
(setting forth streamlined procedure for enforcement of arbitral
awards); id. at § 16 (denying interlocutory appeal of orders to
compel arbitration).
8 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1001, 1010 (1996).
9 &e, e.g., Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The
Emergence of a Federal General Common Law of Arbitration, 6
Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 197,210 (2006); David H. Taylor & Sara
M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence
of Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1085, 1088 (2002).
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and dignity of judicial process."lO According to the
FAA's original proponent, Julius Henry Cohen, the
pre-FAA legal climate was biased in favor of litigation.n The FAA would therefore need to make arbitration agreements robustly enforceable-perhaps
even more than other contracts-in order to enable
the arbitral process to compete on a level playing
field with courtroom adjudication.
3. Ensuring that arbitration agreements would
be treated just like any other cont1·act is certainly an
important step toward leveling the dispute resolution playing field in this way.
If arbitration
agreements continued to be saddled ·with arbitrary
common law restrictions, the FAA could scarcely
make good on its purpose of "provid[ing] a [bona
fide] ... alternative to litigation." (Pet. Br. at 26.)12
But that is not to say that the FAA's mission begins
and ends with making arbitration agreements literally "as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so." Prima Paint v. Flood & Conldin 'A!ffg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
Contracts are by definition heterogeneous. Consider the endless variety of standards for contract
enforcement that prevail in most jurisdictions:
lO Joseph Wheless, Arbitration as a Jndicial Process of Law,
30 W.Va. L. Q. 210, 216 (1924); Comm. on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Law, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 154 (1925) (noting the
FAA's innovation of allowing arbitral awards to be "docketed as
though rendered in an action" so as to have ''the same force and
effect and [be] subject to the same provisions of law as judgments in an action").
11 Julius Henry Cohen, Commercial Arbitration and the Law
15 (1918).
1 2 See Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationali.mtion 20 (1992).
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Gambling, bribery, and usurious contracts are generally unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
7 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts §§ 16:1,
17:1 (4th eel. 2009); 9 id. § 20:38. Non-compete, exculpatory, assignment, fo1·um selection, and choiceof-law clauses are enforceable but only within reason. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 18688, 195, 317; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws §§ 80, 187 (1971). Marriage contracts, suretyship agreements, and contracts for the sale of securities are enforceable only if in writing. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 112, 124; Uniform
Commercial Code § 8-319 (2009). Real estate, adoption, and insurance contracts are typically enforceable through the remedy of specific performance,
while contracts for personal services or the sale of
goods generally are not. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 367; 25 Williston on Contracts
§§ 67:61, 67:87, 67:94. And so on.
The upshot is that there is no uniform standard
of contract enforceability to which arbitration
agreements could possibly aspire. Nor would such a
standard be desirable, as different enforcement rules
for different types of contracts helps further other
public policies, such as promoting free markets, policing fraud and sharp dealing, or deterring tortuous
and anti-social behavior. The FAA's purpose was
simply to ensure that arbitration agreements were
not denied enforcement because of unjustified considerations such as the historic "mistrust" or "suspicion" of arbitration--considerations that generally
did not inure to the detriment of other contracts. See
Shearsonl Am. Exp., Inc. v. A1c1v!ahon, 482 U.S. 220,
231 (1987); 1Vlitsubishi 1.Wotors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-

11
ler-Pl:ymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). This is
the sense in which FAA § 2 directs courts "to enforce . . . agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms"~·that is, according to their merits. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
Outside of the preemption context, the
4.
resounding antidiscrimination message of the
Court's seminal FAA decisions has been that
arbitration must be considered litigation's equal,
even with respect to the resolution of federal
statutory claims. This was not always the case: It
used to be that the Court regarded the arbitration
process as positively "inferior to judicial processes."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
As compared with a judicial forum, for instance,
arbitration affords a less robust factfinding process.
See id. at 57-58. ·without legal training, arbitrators
were considered prone to misinterpret and misapply
governing law. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight S:ys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); cf Prima Paint, 388
U.S. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting) (considering it
"fantastic" that arbitrators could "decide legal issues").
The very same qualities that made
arbitration "efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious"
for merchants, Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58,
were thought to render it inappropriate to adjudicate
rights under federal statutes such as Title VII and
the 1933 Act that embody important public values.
See, e.g., 1:d. at 49-50; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. For
these and other reasons, the Court had long held
that arbitration was not «merely a form of trial."
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Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,
202 (1956).
By the mid-1980s, however, the Court began to
chart a dramatically different course. It came to see
its earlier assessments of arbitration as ""pervaded
by . . . 'the old judicial hostility to arbitration.'"
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480; see also 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1470 n.9
(2009). On closer inspection, it found little evidence
to suggest that arbitrators were "[in]capable of
handling the factual and legal complexities" of
statutory claims. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
And notwithstanding the other structural differences
between arbitration and litigation, there was no
reason to assume at the outset that the arbitral
process was incapable of adequately resolving such
claims. Whereas the Court had previously viewed
the election to arbitrate as a substantive waiver of
"the parcel of 1-ights behind a cause of action,'' Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203, it now came to see the
election as little more than a tradeoff between
comparable dispute resolution f01'Ullls. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) ("An
agreement to arbitrate . . . is, in effect, a specialized
kind of forum-selection clause.").
The Court's later nonarbitrability jurisprudence
therefore stands for the more enlightened
proposition that lower courts may no longer treat
arbitration as inferior to litigation based on
"outmoded presumptions" that were now "far out of
step" with modern realities. Rodriguez de Quijas,
490 U.S. at 481. Instead, arbitration is to be pre-
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sumed an "adequate substitute for [courtroom]
adjudication." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229.
This presumption does not completely foreclose
treating arbitration and litigation differently in
circumstances
where
they
are,
in
fact,
fundamentally different. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (leaving
open the possibility that an arbitration agreement
will not be enforced where a party would be unable
"effectively [to] vindicat[e] her federal statutory
rights in the arbitral forum"). It only forbids such
disparate treatment based on biases against
arbitration-"generalized attacks" that ..rest on
suspicion of arbitration as a method of ... resolving
disputes." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
In the almost forty years of this Court's FAA
jurisprudence from Willw to Gilmer, therefore, the
relevant comparison has always been between
arbitration
and
litigation-not
arbitration
agreements and other agreements. The refusal to
enforce arbitration agreements per se was never the
problem; rather, it was the refusal to do so based on
misconceptions about the arbitration process.
5. In the preemption context this basic principle
of nondiscrimination between arbitration and litigation has come to be conflated with the purpose of
"plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts." (Pet. Br. at 2.) Even in
the preemption area, however, the Court's precedents reflect a core understanding of the FAA's
"equal footing" mandate as primarily designed to
combat unwarranted discrimination against arbitra-
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tion as a process rather than a contract. As articulated by Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984), and its progeny, the fundamental preemptive
message of FAA § 2 is that states may not, without
good reason, require a judicial forum when federal
law allowed the parties to contract fm· judicial alternatives. See id. at 10; see also Preston, 128 S. Ct. at
987 (extending Southland to administrative proceedings); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987). In
other words, from a federalism perspective the trouble with the states was that they were antiarbitration (or pro-litigation)~not that they privileged other ag1·eements at the expense of arbitration
ag1·eements. 13

B.

Published Lower Court Decisions Recognize The FAA's
Primary Purpose Of Placing
Arbitration On The Same
Footing As Litigation, Even
Though They Continue To
Describe This In Terms of
Nondiscrimination Between
Arbitration Agreements And
Other Agreements

The court below correctly held that FAA § 2 did
not preempt the Discover Bank rule because the rule
treats collective action waivers with respect to
arbitration and litigation equally, and thus could not
13 See Mitchell v. Am. Fair Credit Ass'n., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr.
2d 193, 201 (Cal. App. 2002); see a.Zso Fosler v. lJ;Jidwest Care
Ctr. II, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 1003, 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding
that any "pro-judicial forum" state legislation is necessarily
"anti-arbitration" and theref01·e preempted by the FAA};
Stephen J. Ware, The Alabama Story, 7 Disp. Resol. Mag. 24,
27 (2001).
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possibly re-enact judicial hostility toward the
arbitral process. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009). Many com·ts have
similarly grasped FAA§ 2's core purpose of leveling
the playing field between arbitration and litigation,
even though they continue to express this purpose in
terms of placing arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other agreements.l4
For instance, in Carbajal v. H&R Bloch Tax Services, Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook,
J.), the Seventh Circuit understood the basic point
that a general contract defense such as unconscionability might be preempted by the FAA if it were applied in a way that discriminated against arbitration. The "cry of 'unconscionable!"' it explained, may
not be used to "disparage[] the [arbitl·ation process]
as second-class adjudication." !d. at 906. In the
same breath, however, it invoked the familiar comparison with other contracts: "It is precisely to still
such cries that the Federal Arbitration Act equates
arbitration with other contractual terms." !d.
Courts other than the Seventh Circuit (and the
Ninth Circuit below) have similarly refused to preempt state unconscionability rules on the quite sensible ground that those rules did not treat arbitration any differently from the way they treated litigation. Thus, the reason why the Second Circuit held
14 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,
498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2007); Mitchell, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
201 (describing the "common chord" of FAA preemption cases
in terms of ensuring that the arbitration process is not
"treated . . . as a disfavored method of resolving disputes,"
while nonetheless describing the FAA's goal as "putting arbitration clauses on an equal footing with other contracts").
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that FAA § 2 does not preempt the Discover Bank
rule is that the rule applies "whether the consumer is

being asked to waive the right to class action litigation or the right to classwide arbitration." Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 134
(2d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Although the
court described this in terms of "plac[ing] arbitration
agreements with class action waivers on the exact
same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the context of arbitration," id. (emphasis
altered, quotation omitted), its underlying rationale
was that the Discover Bank rule treated arbitration
and litigation equally.
Similarly, in Homa v. American Express Co., 558
F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2009), the Third Circuit held
that New Jersey's equivalent of the Discover Bank
rule was not preempted by the FAA because it applied equally to class action waivers '"whether in arbitration or in court litigation."' Jd. at 230. Nonetheless, the court portrayed this rule as a "general
contract defense" that treated arbitration agreements the same as all other agreements, even
though the rule did nothing of the sort: It applied
only to dispute resolution agreements.
The same is true of Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v.
Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir.
2004), a case Petitioner mistakenly cites in its favor.
There, the Fifth Circuit correctly held that the lower
court's use of the unconscionability defense to invalidate an arbitration clause was not preempted by
FAA§ 2. The Fifth Circuit's rationale was that the
use of the defense did not "discriminate against arbitration" in the sense that it did not "necessarily ex-
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press the impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation." ld. at 170. Despite this, the court
invoked the familiar mantra that "Section 2 of the
FAA puts arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts," which it understood as requiring arbitration agreements to be enforced
"unless they are invalid under principles of state law
that govern all contracts." Id. at 166.
In these and other examples, judges and commentators15 betray a consistent understanding of the
FAA § 2's purpose as ensuring "equal footing" between arbitration and litigation, even though they
have continued to describe this in terms of ''plac[ing]
arbit1·ation agreements on equal footing with all
other contracts." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
Up to this point, there has simply been no need
for the Court to address this tension.16 As the
instant case suggests, however, this tension is
quietly building up in the lower courts. And judging
from the numerous petitions for certiorari that have
1 5 See, e.g., 1 Ian R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law
§10.7.2, at 10:52 {1999) (arguing that a law is "'generally applicable" if it "applie[s] equally to judicial and arbitral proceedings"); Jane VanLare, Comment, From Protection to Favoritism? The Federal Policy Toward Arbitration Vis-a- Vis Competing State Policies, 11 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 473, 490-91 (2006)
(describing the FAA's purpose on the one hand as "mak[ing]
arbit1-ation agreements equal in strength to other contractual
provisions" and on the other as placing "arbitration on an equal
footing with litigation"); Ware, supra, at 1026 (arguing that if
punitive damages waivers are not unconscionable in the litigation context, neither should they be in the arbitration context,
but justifying tlris in terms of "'placing arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts"').
16 Tlris is for some of the same reasons explained in section
II.C, infra.
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implicitly grappled with it in recent years,l7 the
issue is likely to recur if left unresolved. We
therefore urge the Court to clarify that FAA § 2's
central nondiscrimination mandate is to reverse
unjustified hostility against arbitration as a process
(and only secondarily as a contract) so that
arbitration can compete on a level playing field with
litigation.

C.

The Goal Of NonDiscrimination Between Arbitration And Litigation Is
Not A Slippery Slope To Making Arbitration And Litigation Identical

Petitioner argues that interpreting FAA § 2's
antidisc1•imination principle so as to place arbitration and litigation on the same footing would 1) give
the states license to transform arbitration into litigation, and 2) conflict with this Court's decision in Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008). Both arguments are without merit.

1. The FAA's goal of nondiscrimination between
arbitration and litigation should not be confused
with the very different goal of casting arbitration in
litigation's image-one that we are united with Peti17 See, for instance, certiorari petitions filed in: Cellco Partnership v. Litman, 2010 WL 3700269 (No. 10-398); Beverly Enters.-Ill. v. Mitchell, 130 S. Ct. 1698 (2009) (No. 09-747); Beverly Enters.-nl., Inc. v. Blazier, 130 S. Ct. 1698 (2009) (No. 09746); Athens Disposal Co. v. Franco, 130 S. Ct. 1050 (2009) (No.
09-272); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Gentry, 128 S. ct. 1743
(2008) (07-998); T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128 S. Ct. 2500
(2008) (No. 07-976); County Bank of Rehoboth Beach v. Muhammad, 127 S. Ct. 2032 (2007) (06-907); Cingular Wireless
LLC v. Mendoza, 126 S. Ct. 2353 (2006) (05-1119).
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tioner in rejecting. Some of arbitration's chief virtues inhere in those very differences: streamlined
discovery and review, confidentiality, and the selection of private neutrals, to name a few. IS But there
is no inconsistency in applauding those distinctions
while nonetheless insisting that states may not discriminate improperly against arbitration.
The operative distinction here is between simple
equality and equality of opportunity. FAA§ 2, like
the vast majority of antidiscrimination regimes,
represents a rule of equal opportunity. Equal opportunity does not require all persons or things to be
treated exactly the same in all ways. Title VII, for
example, prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion but also requires employers to "reasonably accommodate"
religious
differences.
See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eG), 2000e-2 (2002); EEOC v.
Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 859 F.2d
610, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1988). In certain circumstances, Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause
not just permit, but may also require, governmentfunded educational institutions to offer athletic
teams segregated by gender. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n., 695 F.2d 1126, 1131-32
(9th Cir. 1982); O'Connor v. Board of Educ. of
Schools Dist. No. 23, 645 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.
1981). In these and other examples, antidiscrimination law recognizes that perfect equality is sometimes not just impossible but also positively undesirable, and thus that equal opportunity may in certain
18 See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 8. Ct. 1456, 1471
(2009); Mitsubishi A1otors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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instances require unequal treatment.I9 The point of
an antidiscrimination regime is not to erase all
"'[i]nhe1•ent differences,"' for some may instead be
"cause for celebration." See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Rather, it is to ensure that those differences are not used to "create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority" of certain persons or things. See id. at 534.
The law has tended to capture this insight with
the notion that nondiscrimination only requires persons or things that are "similarly situated [to] be
treated alike!' Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985). By the same token, "things
which are different in fact" need not "be treated in
law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). Thus, the Court has upheld gender classifications based on sex if they are
"not invidious, but rather realistically reflect[] the
fact that the sexes are not similarly situated." A1ichael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
The rationale is that if there are legitimate
differences between men and women, it is at least as
likely that their disparate treatment is a function of
those differences rather than of unjustified criteria

19 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2002) (permitting employer to discriminate intentionally if a protected characteristic
other than race is a "bona fide occupational qualification");
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") art. XX,
Oct.. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (permitting member states to discriminate against goods of other contracting
states, inter alia, in order to "protect human, animal, or plant
life''); Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-1, at
1437 (2d. ed. 1988) (arguing that the "right to equal treatment"
guaranteed by the equal protection clause is not a "universal
demand for sameness").
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such as "old boy'' networks or negative stereotypes
about women.
In the same vein, the basic antidiscrimination
message of the Court's nonarbitrability jurisprudence is that arbitration and litigation are similarly
situated in their capacity to resolve adequately the
vast majority of civil disputes. States ignore this
message when, for no reason other than mistrust of
the arbitral process, they treat arbitration and litigation differently in this respect.
But arbitration and litigation are generally not
similarly situated in terms of the availability of
juries, the need to publish opinions, the scope of
discovery, and the applicability of rules of courtroom
procedure. (See Pet. Br. at 29, 41, 50.) For these are
the very "evils" of litigation that the FAA was designed to help merchants avoid. 20 Imposing them on
arbitration thereby treats similarly two dispute
resolution processes that are essentially different
with respect to those "evils., This is no less an
instance of discrimination. See Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) ("[S]ometimes the grossest
discrimination can lie in treating things that are

20 See 1924 hearings, supra, at 34-35 (identifying among
such "evils": expense, procedural delay caused by motions and
"other steps taken by litigants," and the jury's lack of familiarity with business realities).
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different as though they were exactly alike."). 2l Petitioner reaches essentially the same conclusion when
it argues that if a state were to require the use of juries or published awards in arbitration, this would
raise an inference of precisely the type of "hostility"
and "anti-a1·bitration" sentiment that the FAA was
designed to reverse. (Pet. Br. at 29, 40.)
Moreover, it is far f1·om clear that certain benefits
or burdens that apply to litigation should not apply
equally well to arbitration. For better or worse, in
the past several decades arbitration has evolved into
something of a "civil court of general jurisdiction."22
To that end, if judges hearing a particular case
would be entitled to award certain forms of relief
such as punitive damages, the law has evolved to
enable arbitrators to do so, too. See ~!astrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 61 n.7
(1995). If judges are immune from suit, so, too, were
arbitrators. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993).
By emphasizing the ways in which arbitration
and litigation are different, Petitioner ignores the
equally important ways in which they are the same.
21 See also United States. v. Booher, 543 U.S. 220, 252-53
(2005) (Breyer, J.) (holding that different criminal conduct
should not receive same punishment under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines); Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ~ 164,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) (finding
a ·violation of GATT art. XX's non-discrimination principle
where the U.S. required all sh1·imp exporting countries to adopt
"essentially the same" measures for the protection of sea turtles
"without taking into consideration different conditions which
may" prevail in those countries).
22 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of'Arbitration, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 6, 8 (1997).
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There can be no worse outcome for arbitration if
states are entitled to regulate litigation for the public good but the FAA disables them from regulating
arbitration in exactly the same way where the two
are similarly situated. This will only exacerbate the
perception of arbitration as a forum in which the
usual rules do not apply-a dubious version of litigation rigged in favor of corporate interests. It will defeat the overriding mission of all good a1·bitration
law and policy-the FAA included-which is to enable arbitration to stand on its own two feet as a "legitimate," "credibl[e], and "true'' alternative to litiga·
tion.23
2. In its petition for certiorari, Petitioner incorrectly argued that the Court's recent decision in Preston, 128 S. Ct. 978, "forecloses" an interpretation of
FAA § 2's nondiscrimination principle as requiring
arbitration to be placed on the same footing as litigation. (Pet. Cert. at 28-29.)
The California Talent Agency Act ("TAA") that
was held preempted in Preston vested exclusive jurisdiction in the California Labor Commissioner to
decide disputes involving talent agents and their clients-even those disputes the parties had agreed to
arbitrate. Because the TAA thereby withheld such
jurisdiction equally from both arbitration and courts
of law, Petitioner reasons that FAA preemption cannot turn on whether arbitration and litigation are
treated the same.

23 See Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114,
1115 (1st Cir. 1989) (Selya, J.); Revised Uniform A1·bitration
Act §§ 6 cmt., 23 cmt. b (2000).
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Petitioner's argument hinges on drawing a sharp
distinction between judicial and administrative proceedings-a distinction whose salience is questionable for at least two reasons. First, both the administrative and judicial forums in Preston were statesponsored. The same danger that states \Yould discriminate in favor of their own dispute resolution
processes is no less pertinent in the administrative
than in the litigation context. Second, even though
the TAA gave the Labor Commissioner original jurisdiction to hear talent agent disputes, it provided a
right of de novo review solely to the Superior Court.
See id. at 985-86 & n.6. The administrative forum in
Preston was therefore intimately linked to the judicial system-so much so that the Court explicitly
'\lisapproYe[d] the distinction between judicial and
administrative proceedings." I d. at 987. Instead, it
held that "state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in
another forum, whether judicial or administrative,"
are preempted by the FAA.24 ld. at 981 (emphasis
added). Consistent with Preston, in this brief we use
the term "litigation" broadly to include administrative proceedings.

24 This is consistent with lower court precedents as well.
See, e.g., Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1120 n.4 ("That the restriction is
administrative. . [is irrelevant]. The gravamen of the FAA is
to preserve the arbitral bargain against [any] external onslaughts manifesting hostility to arbitration."); Gutierrez v.
Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 274 n.6 {Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
("Court decisions on the preemptive effect of the FAA do not
distinguish between ... administrative regulations and judicial
decisions that bm·den arbitration agreements.

25

II.

EVEN IF THE FAA'S PURPOSE IS
TO ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT
BETWEEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS, IT IS NOT NECESSARY
FOR A LAW TO APPLY TO "ALL"
AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO
AVOID PREEMPTION

Petitioner contends that '"as a matter of federal
law, arbitration agreements and clauses are to be
enforced unless they are invalid under principles of
state law that govern all contracts."' (Pet. Br. at 3.)
On this view, the Discover Bank standard is preempted simply because it is "a rule applicable only to
dispute-resolution agreements," not a rule that
"appl[ies] universally to 'any' and every contract."
(Chamber Amicus Br. at 25; see also Pet. Br. at 3, 17,
31, 40 (emphasis added).)
The "all contracts" standard relied on by Petitioner cannot be correct for at least two reasons.
First, it is logically incoherent. Second, it makes for
unsound policy in the "mandatory'' binding arbitration area. Thus, even if the FAA's organizing purpose were to place arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other agreements, this plainly cannot
mean all other agreements.
A.

The "All Contracts" Standard
Is Logically Incoherent

As a logical matter, no law can apply to all contracts except by distorting beyond all recognition the
common-sense meaning of the term "apply." A law
"applies" in any meaningful sense only to
agreements whose enforceability it has the power to
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affect. It fails to apply to agreements that it leaves
unaffected.
1. Contrary to popular orthodoxy in this area,
not even native contract law principles apply to all
contracts. Take the unconscionability defense. Even
in its <'pure" form, the defense only has the ability to
affect the enforceability of agreements tainted by
indicia of unconscionability. It is irrelevant to, and
leaves completely intact, all other conscionable
agreements.
For this reason, "generally applicable'' contract
law doctrines quite dearly fail to "place[] arbitration
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts," Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 443, 477 (2006) (emphasis added). In
fact, their very purpose is to enforce inequalities
among contracts based on defects such as the existence of unconscionable terms or conduct. Consider
that the unconscionability defense does not even
manage to place all arbitration agreements on the
same footing because it properly refuses enforcement
to some arbitration agreements but grants it toothers. And given any pair of agreements-~me arbitration and one non-arbitration-the doctrine has no
qualms treating them unequally depending on the
presence of certain impermissible procedural and
substantive factors.
Because neither the so-called "ordinary"
unconscionability rule nor the Discover Bank
standard (even assuming they are different) applies
to "all" contracts, FAA§ 2 preemption simply cannot
turn on this standard.
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2. Amici American Banker's Association et al.
nonetheless insist that ordinary contract law doctrines (which tend to be directed at procedural defects in contract formation) apply to all contracts regardless of subject matter, while the Discover Bank
standard is limited to contracts relating to the subject of dispute resolution. But the strength of this
retort hinges on maintaining a bright-line distinction
between procedure and substance--a distinction that
falls apart on further scrutiny.
First, the unconscionability defense depends at
least in part on proving that the substance of the
agreement-not just the process of its formation"shocks the conscience." 2A Lary Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302:27 (3d
ed. 2009). The same goes for other contract doctrines such as impossibility or frustration of purpose,
which have nothing to do with contract formation
and much to do with the substance of the agreement
struck (and the effect that future events or circumstances have on them).
Cf. Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
556 (1995) (Stevens, J ., dissenting) (describing impossibility as a generally applicable contract defense
that avoids preemption by the FAA).
Second, the FAA is itself limited to certain subject matters insofar as it is inapplicable, inter alia, to
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
Why should a law be procedural-and hence saved
from preemption-if it regulates all unconscionable
agreements falling within these subject matters, but
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substantive-and hence preempted-just because it
1·egulates only unconscionable dispute resolution
agreements falling within those same subject matters?
3. Generic contract law defenses such as unconscionability seem as if they have universal application because they are potentially relevant to any contract regardless of subject matter: Any and all contracts, no matter what their content, must pass the
unconscionability test. But the same can be said of
the following hypothetical statute: "Any and all contracts that contain an arbitration clause must so indicate in underlined capital letters on the front page
of the contract." By its terms, all contracts must
comply with this requirement regardless of subject
matter. But this simply cannot be what it means for
a law to be a "groundD ... for the revocation of any
contract," 9 U.S.C. § 2, and thus to avoid preemption
by the FAA. For our hypothetical law is scarcely distinguishable from the state law at issue in Doctor~
Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), which
the Court correctly held was preempted by the FAA
because it «singl[ed] out arbitration provisions for
suspect status." ld. at 687. The upshot is that vil·tually any law can be re-described as potentially applicable to all contracts-even one that singles out
arbitration. 25
Potentially applicability, however, is not the
same as actual applicability. No matter how it is re25 Notable examples include Fosler v. Midwest Care Center
II, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 1003, 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (O'Malley, J.,
concurring); Brief in Opposition at 3, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Gentry, 128 S. Ct. 1743 (2008) (No. 07-998) (quoting Cal. Civ.
Code § 1668 (West 2007)).
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worded, we know that the law at issue in Casarotto
does not actually extend to all contracts. This is not
just because the statute is irrelevant to all contracts
lacking arbitration clauses, but more importantly
because it is easily discernible whether or not a contract does in fact contain such a clause. But the
same is not true for contract defenses such as unconscionability. Here, it is rarely immediately obvious
that a given agreement will be found unconscionable
or that facts extrinsic to the agreement will not later
be discovered that reveal other defects in contract
formation, such as fraud in the inducement. This is
why generic contl·act defenses appear applicable, in
principle, to any contract. But like all laws, those
defenses unavoidably classify according to the type
of misconduct they seek to police. See Clements v.
Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2845 (1982). Therefore,
they actually apply only to contracts tainted by such
misconduct and have no applicability whatsoever to
all other contracts. As such, the reason why they
avoid preemption, while other laws do not, cannot be
that they apply to "air' contracts.
B.

Sound Policy Militates
Against The "All Contracts"
Standard

1. The "all contracts" standard should be rejected
for the further reason that it makes for bad policy in
the "mandatory" binding arbitration area. Because
legislatures rarely (if ever) pass legislation that
governs "all" or even substantially all contracts, the
standard has the effect of preempting practically any
state law that happens to interfere with the
enforcement of a challenged arbitration agreement.
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This results in de facto field preemption-something
the Court has explicitly rejected in the arbitration
area.26
It is difficult to overstate the detriment of such a
result. Many statutes and judicial decisions that are
currently preempted under the "all contracts"
standard seek to protect the weak and untutored
rather than to revivify the ancient hostility to"\>vard
arbitration. See, e.g., Ting u. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126,
1148 (9th Cir. 2003); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998); Saturn Distrib.
Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Discover Banh standard, for example, helps curb
"\>Vl'ongful or exploitative conduct that might go
unpoliced if left to the logic of the market. Any possible threat it poses to arbitration would appear to
be outweighed by the considerable public good that
accomplishes.
2. Rather than to effectuate the voluntary selfgovernance of disputing pm·ties, the inevitable consequence of the "all contracts" rule is to turn arbitration into a device for evading state governance.
States will continue to regulate oppressive provisions in cont1·acts that contemplate litigation for the
resolution of disputes, FAA§ 2 preemption notwithstanding. But where the contract drafter has been
clever enough to insert an arbitration clause, the
FAA will step in to displace the state regtilation.
Thus, the Discover Bank standard will continue to
26 It is well-settled that preemption based on FA:\ § 2 is a
species of implied obstacle preemption rather than field preemption. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
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protect consumers from class action waivers. But if
Petitioner is correct, the standard will be preempted
as to class arbitration waivers. The same will be
true of virtually any other law that applies equally
to arbitration and litigation, such as a law that gives
franchisees a non-waivable right to collect attorneys'
fees in certain disputes with franchisors, see CaL
Corp. Code Ann. §§ 31302.5, 31512 (West 2009), legislation that protects borrowers from waiving their
right to punitive damages in lending agreements, see
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 58-15-34(L)(4) (2009), or a statute
that voids any provision in construction-related conti·acts requiring in-state adherents "to bring [any]
suit or arbitration proceeding" in an out-of-state forum." See 9 La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 2779 (VVest 2009).
These laws will achieve their intended effect with
respect to agreements that anticipate litigation, but
the FAA will render them useless as to agreements
that provide for arbitration.
In these circumstances, drafters of form contracts
would be foolish not to insist on arbitration for the
resolution of all disputes. For by doing so, they will
manage to insulate themselves from just about any
state measure that happens to interfere (in whole or
in part) with the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement. In an era in which arbitration has come
under increasing criticism and scrutiny, this cannot
be a positive development for the "national policy
favoring arbitration." Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 UB. 1, 10 (1984).
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C.

This Court Has Never Held
That A State Law Must Apply
To "All Contracts" In Order
To Avoid Preemption By The

FAA

To its credit, the CoUl't has never explicitly held
that the FAA preempts state laws unless they apply
to "all contracts," even though it has used the "all
contracts" language in several prior decisions. 27
This is largely because the Court's seminal FAA~
preemption decisions have all involved state laws
that either (i) clearly singled out arbitration2ll or (ii)
did not single out arbitration but whose unavoidable
consequence was to force into a judicial m· administrative forum disputes that were otherwise destined
for arbitration.29 The first category of laws is preempted under current law because it runs afoul of
the rule that "[c]ourts may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only
to arbitration provisions." Casarotto, 517 U.S. at
687. The second category is also preempted because
it, too, expresses the old common-law suspicion toward arbitration as an inferior method of resolving
disputes.
The Discover Bank rule falls into neither of these
categories. Rather, it raises the hitherto unan2 7 See Hall Street Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 1396,
1402 (2008); Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443. In neither of these
cases, however, was the Conrt asked to determine whether the
FAA preempts a law that applies to some, bnt not all, contracts.
Accordingly, their references to "all contracts" are dicta.
2s See Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) Perry, 482 U.S. 483.
29 See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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swered question of whether a law that applies to
some, but not literally all, contracts is nonetheless
preempted by the FAA.
To be sure, the Court has held that "[s]tates may
regulate ... arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."' AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281
(1995). It has also held that "state law, whether of
legislative or judicial origin, is applicable £{that law
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. But from neither of these
pronouncements does it follow that a state law
avoids FAA preemption only if it is completely general-that is, only if it (purportedly) applies to "all"
contracts.
For these reasons, if the Court were to repudiate
the "all contracts" standard in this case, it would not
be overturning its own prior precedent.

III.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS,
FAA § 2 DOES NOT PREEMPT THE
DISCOVER BANK STANDARD

The central issue in this case is whether the
Discover Bank rule discriminates against arbitration
so as to warrant preemption by FAA.§ 2 even though
it treats arbitration and litigation exactly the same.
As explained by the court below, the underlying
rationale behind the Discover Bank standard is that
"when the potential for individual gain is small, very
few plaintiffs, if any, will pursue individual arbitra-

34

tion or litigation, which greatly reduces the aggregate liability a company faces when it has exacted
small sums from millions of consumers." Laster v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir.
2009). The standard was therefore designed to address the perceived unfail.·ness of, and disincentives
created by, collective action waivers-a problem as
to which arbitration and litigation are similarly
situated.
A law that treats arbitration and litigation similarly where they are similarly situated presents little
danger of unthinkingly re-enacting the antiarbitration hostility that the FAA was intended to
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reverse.30 Petitioner has not offered any alternative
basis from which to infer discrimination other than
to claim that Discover Bank is a "distortion" of ordinary unconscionability principles. (Pet. Br. at 47.)
But the fact that the Discover Bank rule represents a
"unique" breed of unconscionability, (see id. at 3, 4),
even if true, does not compel the much more ambitious claim that the rule improperly discriminates
against arbitration in the way that FAA § 2 forbids.

3o Several commentators cited by Amici in support of Petitioner only reinforce this conclusion. See, e.g., F. Paul Bland,
Jr. & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 369, 391
(2009) (arguing that the Discover Bank standard is not preempted because it applies equally to arbitration and litigation);
Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 Hastings Bus. L.J.
39, 52 (2006) (arguing that a different California
unconscionability standard should have been preempted by the
F.I\A because it is "premised on the inferiority of arbitration as
compared with litigation."); Aaron-Andrew P. B1·uhl, The UnconscionabilitY Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1449-52
(2008) (questioning whether discrimination can be inferred
from disparate unconscionability rulings, but considering such
rulings only as to arbitration- and litigation-related
agreements); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less
Traveled Will Make All The Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. Disp. Resol. 61,
78, 81 (2005) ("distill[ing]" a rule that an application of the
unconscionability should be preempted if it "presume[s] that
arbitration in and of itself is inferior to a court proceeding");
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 185, 198-220
(2004) (inferring hostility in the application of the
unconscionability defense only from disparate outcomes in
cases involving arbitration and other dispute resolution
agreements).
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At most, Petitioner has shown that the California
Supreme Court erroneously applied its own state's
unconscionability rules in formulating the Discover
Banh standard. But this in itself does not, and
should not, create a federal issue.

CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that the Discover Bank
rule is not preempted by FAA § 2 because the rule
treats arbitration and litigation equally, and thus
fails to discriminate against arbitration in the way
the Court's jm·isprudence forbids.
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